Note on Attacking Object Detectors with Adversarial Stickers by Eykholt, Kevin et al.
Note on Attacking Object Detectors with
Adversarial Stickers
Kevin Eykholt2, Ivan Evtimov3, Earlence Fernandes3, Bo Li1,
Dawn Song1, Tadayoshi Kohno3, Amir Rahmati4, Atul Prakash2,
and Florian Tramer5
1University of California, Berkeley
2University of Michigan Ann Arbor
3University of Washington
4Stony Brook University
5Stanford University
Abstract
Deep learning has proven to be a powerful tool for computer vision and
has seen widespread adoption for numerous tasks. However, deep learning
algorithms are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. These
adversarial inputs are created such that, when provided to a deep learning
algorithm, they are very likely to be mislabeled. This can be problematic
when deep learning is used to assist in safety critical decisions. Recent
research has shown that classifiers can be attacked by physical adversarial
examples under various physical conditions. Given the fact that state-
of-the-art objection detection algorithms are harder to be fooled by the
same set of adversarial examples, here we show that these detectors can
also be attacked by physical adversarial examples. In this note, we briefly
show both static and dynamic test results. We design an algorithm that
produces physical adversarial inputs, which can fool the YOLO object
detector and can also attack Faster-RCNN with relatively high success
rate based on transferability. Furthermore, our algorithm can compress
the size of the adversarial inputs to stickers that, when attached to the
targeted object, result in the detector either mislabeling or not detecting
the object a high percentage of the time. This note provides a small set of
results. Our upcoming paper will contain a thorough evaluation on other
object detectors, and will present the algorithm.
1 Introduction
Deep learning and deep neural networks(DNN) are widely used in computer
vision, especially for safety critical tasks such as autonomous driving [5]. How-
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Figure 1: Output of our adversarial attack algorithm. The Stop sign in the
image is printed such that is is the same size as a U.S. Stop sign.
ever, research has shown that deep networks are also vulnerable to digital ma-
nipulations of their inputs, resulting in a class of attacks known as ‘adversarial
inputs’ [1, 3, 4, 6, 8]. These digital manipulations cause deep networks to misla-
bel an input, despite no visible difference in the image. For example, a slight
modification to some pixels in Stop sign image can cause a network to label it
as a Speed Limit sign.
Our recent work introduced an algorithm that produced physical adversarial
inputs, which fooled a DNN classifier trained for traffic sign recognition [2].
Recently, we have also designed an algorithm that produces physical adversarial
inputs, which can fool a state-of-the art object detection algorithm, YOLO (You
Only Look Once). YOLO is a deep convolution neural network that performs
real-time object detection [7]. Our algorithm can generate an entire object
that is either mislabeled or not detected by YOLO. Also, the algorithm can
generate small sticker perturbations that can be applied the object to similarly
fool YOLO. See Figure 1 for an example output of our algorithm generating
an adversarial stop sign. We crop out the background of the generated image
and print the Stop sign. For adversarial stickers, we cut out the perturbation
areas and attach them a real Stop sign(e.g. in Figure 1, the sign areas would be
the upper and lower colored rectangles on the sign). Compared with classifiers,
detectors are more challenging to fool as they process the entire image and can
use contextual information (e.g. the orientation and position of the target object
in the scene) in their predictions.
2 Attack Demo
We evaluated our sticker attack against YOLOv2, which is trained to recognize
80 object classes including a class for Stop signs. For the experiment, we took
several pictures of the object, a Stop sign, as well as a short video. These were
provided to YOLO for detection. We used YOLO’s default detection threshold
of 25% (i.e. an object is detected if YOLO is at least 25% confident). Figure 3
2
and Figure 2 show several images from our experiment as well as the detected
objects in those images. For video results, please visit https://iotsecurity.
eecs.umich.edu/#yolo. In the video, YOLO only detects the Stop sign when
the camera is close to the sign. In an autonomous driving scenario, detecting a
stop sign only a few feet from the sign is likely too late to react to the sign and
safely brake.
In an effort to explore the transferability of our adversarial sticker generation
algorithm, we provided the video to Faster-RCNN, another state-of-the-art ob-
ject detector. Our adversarial stickers were able to fool Faster-RCNN in many
of the video frames. Visit https://iotsecurity.eecs.umich.edu/#yolo to
view the video results. Given that this is a black-box attack on Faster-RCNN,
it is expected that the attack may not be as successful on Faster-RCNN as it is
on YOLO. In a future update, we plan to explore these details further.
Figure 2: YOLO detection output for a real stop sign with adversarial stickers
(phone camera pictures)
Figure 3: YOLO detection output for a real stop sign with adversarial stickers
(still frames from video)
3
3 Algorithm Overview
This algorithm is based off our earlier work on attacking classifiers [2]. Funda-
mentally, we take an optimization approach to generating adversarial examples.
However, our experimental experience indicates that generating robust physical
adversarial examples for detectors requires simulating a larger set of varying
physical conditions than what is needed to fool classifiers. This is likely be-
cause a detector takes much more contextual information into account while
generating predictions. Key properties of the algorithm include the ability to
specify sequences of physical condition simulations, and the ability to specify
the translation invariance property. That is, a perturbation should be effective
no matter where the target object is situated within the scene. As an object
can move around freely in the scene depending on the viewer, perturbations
not optimized for this property will likely break when the object moves. Our
upcoming paper on this topic will contain more details on this algorithm.
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